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Preface 
The investigations undertaken in the present monograph ensued as a 
response to the growing awareness of aporetic constellations in the history of 
Yogãcãra research. This awareness crystallized particularly in connection 
with my work related to Sthiramati's Trimsikãvijnaptibhãsya, in the course of 
which I have investigated the sources of a larger part of the terminology 
employed in Tr/TrBh.1 In consideration of the specific phenomenological2 
models elaborated by Vasubandhu and Sthiramati, it seemed justified to 
place the Trimsikã and its Bhãsya into the context of "Yogãcãra-Vijnanavãda". 
However, the question that remained open was: which historical horizon is 
thereby actually referred to? — That is, while investigating the terminology 
that had been elaborated it was recognized how various technical contexts in 
TrBh are genetically related to particular earlier works. But, for various 
reasons, no properly defined historical horizon could be regarded as valid. 
On the contrary, in the course of those investigations it had become 
evident that, in spite of being commonly used as a category of idea-historical 
classification, the designation "Yogäcära-Vijnanavãda" does not really 
possess a definite referential value apart from referring to a considerably 
confused horizon of a number of mutually contradictory assessments of an 
often imprecisely determined body of texts.3 It is, no doubt, correct that we 
have to limit our expectations with regard to the degree of precision that can 
be reached at the present stage in the history of buddhological research. 
Nevertheless, since scientific progress in our historical assessment of this 
important philosophical tradition is demanded as a presupposition for 
adequately understanding the dynamics of its development, it is necessary to 
reflect the unsatisfactory present state, to characterize various factors 
contributing to it and to critically address these with the aim of achieving 
greater clarity, both in terms of the theoretical awareness of the problems 
involved and in terms of the concrete historical solutions provided. 
1
 The critical editions of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of TrBh were published in Vienna 
2007 (ÖAW); those terminological historico-philological contextualizations (still to be 
expanded) will appear in connection with an annotated translation of Sthiramati's 
commentatorial treatise as soon as possible (provided ironies of fate keep a low profile). 
2
 The attribute "phenomenological" is being employed in a general sense with respect to 
Buddhist scholastic thought where philosophical models are elaborated side by side with 
descriptions of psychological states and dynamics, epistemological discussions, accounts of 
soteriological practices, etc. Abstracted from all references to specific events and personal 
experiences, this type of scholastic thought (in contrast to, e.g., sütra literature with its 
abundance of anecdotic material) proceeds in the form of purely eidetic descriptions, thus 
qualifies to receive the general attribute "phenomenological". 
3
 The same can be said for the designations Yogãcãra, Cittamãtra and Vijnanavãda used, 
singly and interchangeably, as alternative expressions. 
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Given the fact that the cultural and educational backgrounds of the 
scholars contributing to Yogãcãra studies are known to differ widely from 
each other, there exists an unavoidable diversity in the degrees of historical 
awareness, on the basis of which contributions are made. To no small extent, 
the general confusion regarding the basic demarcation of the historical 
horizon of "Yogãcära-Vijnãnavãda" is precisely due to this difference of 
historical awareness, expanding from an almost complete lack of historical 
differentiation on the one hand, to positions proceeding from what seems 
amount to a sort of "over-historicizing" attitude on the other. In terms of the 
specific heuristic assumptions of individual scholars on various issues, this 
spectrum is naturally much more diversified. But in order to sketch the 
present problem in bold strokes, these purely formal stereotypes may serve a 
useful purpose at this point. While being easily recognizable by any 
experienced Yogãcãra scholar, they are, of course, by no means meant to 
sublate the desideratum of a differentiated account of the diverse positions of 
leading savants in the field. 
What, for lack of a better term, has presently been designated as an 
"over-historicizing" attitude may express itself as a pronounced tendency to 
explain, even, a natural difference between different elements of a structural 
whole (e.g., the various parts of a given theoretical model) in terms of 
historical differences.1 Expressed in other words, such an attitude tends to 
interpret a given synchronic2 stage of structural diversity in terms of 
diachronic differentiation.3 
In contrast thereto, attitudes of diminished historical awareness 
proceed in reverse direction and tend to reduce diachronic differentiation to 
a single synchronic layer of historically unaccountable diversification. In the 
field of Yogãcãra studies, the latter type of historical reductionism is, in fact, 
closely associated with the name of Vasubandhu. The representatives of a 
fairly ahistorical perspective consider the name as referring to only one 
Yogãcãra author, who, moreover, is regarded as the brother of Asariga, 
another illustrious and prolific Yogãcãra philosopher. Most of what is an 
impressively large corpus of very diversified textual materials is then 
divided into two portions, and the authorship of one part is ascribed to 
Asartga, that of the other to Vasubandhu. In this way, one has succeeded in 
completely eradicating all historical development from the MaulT BhUmi to 
the Trimsikã in one stroke. And one has thereby not only bypassed all the 
problems of intertextual historical relationships, but has actually suppressed 
1
 As a matter of fact, there are obviously a number of instances of composite theoretical 
models with a more or less complicated historical genesis (rather well known in this respect 
is the pratttyasamutpãda model; cf. SCHMITHAUSEN 2000a). But this principle hardly applies 
to every composite model. It is crucial to distinguish from case to case. 
2Cf. below, p. Xn.l . 
3
 That is, the very force and focus of a specific historical outlook may overlook that 
components of a model pertaining to a particular synchronic stage do mutually implicate 
each other. 
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the very possibility of understanding the introduction of novel Yogãcãra-
Vijnãnavãda concepts as being solutions to previously aporetic constellations 
of phenomenological description that were overcome by a particular 
traditional continuity in the course of its own development within the larger 
context of mainly Abhidharma and early Mahãyãna thought. 
Another tendency of interpretation, explicitly posturing as an 
historically informed attitude, provides an even more agonizing twist to the 
horizon of philosophical development than the mere reduction of the second 
Mahãyãna branch to a single synchronic layer had entailed. Apparently 
without being really aware of the inherent absurdities of the perspectives 
promoted, this interpretation essentially insists upon a reversal of the 
historical relationship between the two main branches of Mahãyãna (i.e., 
Madhyamaka and Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda). 
Faced with such a panorama of confusing attitudes dominating the 
field of Yogãcãra studies, no reliable ground was left for me upon which to 
found the perception of a demarcated horizon within which texts employing 
a specific set of Yogãcãra-Vijnanavãda terminology could be located. This 
awareness, originally gained, as said, in the course of investigations related 
to the terminology found in Tr/TrBh, can be reformulated in general 
methodological terms. All Yogãcãra-Vijnãnavãda studies are necessarily 
hampered in their validity as long as no reliable foundation is being 
provided for properly understanding texts pertaining to this genre (e.g., 
MSA/MSABh, MSgr/MSgrBh, MAV/MAVBh, Tr/TrBh, etc.) within the 
horizon of "objective-historical" hermeneutic circles, described by W. Dilthey 
in words that may be quoted here for their simple clarity: 
Aus einzelnen Worten und deren Verbindungen soll das Ganze eines 
Werkes verstanden werden, und doch setzt das volle Verständnis des 
einzelnen schon das des Ganzen voraus. Dieser Zirkel wiederholt sich 
in dem Verhältnis des einzelnen Werkes zu Geistesart und Entwick-
lung seines Urhebers, und er kehrt ebenso zurück im Verhältnis dieses 
Einzelwerkes zu seiner Literaturgattung.1 
(From single terms and their relationships the whole of a work is to be 
understood. However, a complete understanding of specific details 
already presupposes an understanding of the contextual whole. 
This circle repeats itself with respect to the mode a single work is 
related to the characteristic mental horizon of its author and to the 
development of his authorship. And again it is present in the 
characteristic way a given single work is related to its genre.) 
By referring to Dilthey, the intention, naturally, is not to reduce all the 
problems of understanding a text to his theoretical presuppositions. The issue 
at hand is not the theoretical problem of understanding (and translating) a 
1
 W. DILTHEY, "Die Entstehung der Hermeneutik" (1900) in his Gesammelte Schriften, 
Göttingen 1964, volume 5: 316-338; here p. 330. The merely provisional translation is my 
own. 
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text in the light of any hermeneutical theory. At present, we are more simply 
concerned with the text as a structure of technical concepts that is related, both 
synchronically and diachronically, to similar structures.1 And Dilthey has 
merely been quoted for his ability to characterize in two simple sentences the 
formal aspect of the problem of understanding with regard to conceptual 
and textual relationships and developments. Expressed in different terms, the 
insight communicated by Dilthey, which is crucial for us, is that technical 
concepts (and texts embodying them) are always to be understood within 
larger units of contextual structures providing their depths of meaningful-
ness, and within textual frameworks of assimilation and differentiation, both 
in synchronic and diachronic perspectives. Yet to locate any Yogãcãra-
Vijnanavãda text within a genre (as a specific horizon circumscribed by 
identifiable modes of elaboration) entails the task of demarcating it as 
pertaining to a distinct tradition starting in some way, and at some point(s?), 
to develop a specific set of characteristic technical terms forming the 
constituents of new reflective models of philosophical understanding. 
Not least for the historian of ideas the introduction of a novel concept 
in the course of a given Buddhist tradition's development marks a significant 
stage, because its "predecessor" may retrospectively be perceived as an 
aporetic, a philosophically problematic, constellation, which the new concept 
— within a new contextual structure endowing it with meaningfulness — 
attempted to rectify. While such a novel concept may, in a sense, be said to 
1
 A synchronic perspective focuses upon a formal system of interrelated elements 
functioning at a particular time, while a diachronic perspective is focused on the history of 
individual elements. Stemming originally from a purely structuralistic research milieu, 
these terms conveniently designate mutually non-exclusive methodological approaches and 
foci, which consider given phenomena within structures of different contextual directions. 
And as such they can likewise be applied to different contextual levels. On the level of 
textual relationships, we can apply both perspectives in order to understand correlations 
between texts (or between chapters of a given text), historical dependencies, textual strata, 
etc. On the conceptual level, we can understand concepts, in synchronic perspective, as 
components of systematic structures reflecting specific stages of philosophical 
development; but we can also diachronically focus on the employment of a technical term 
in its historical development within particular traditional contexts (cf., e.g., the articles on 
the notion of dharma in TIP 32 [2004]). 
Furthermore, particular philosophical concepts forming the subject of our 
investigations may themselves embody both synchronic and diachronic implications. Being 
of a very different order, these implications are then related to the sphere of 
phenomenological description of our classical Indian authors. In other words, their terms 
coined to account for specific features of experiential reality may entail both synchronic 
and diachronic implications, that is, as phenomenological notions. An obvious example is 
the Yogãcãra-Vijfiãnavãda notion of vijnãna with its diachronic (e.g., momentariness, 
karma-phala-sambandha, etc.) and synchronic (e.g., simultaneity of several levels and types 
of vijnãna, simultaneous presence of at least five caittas, etc.) implications. 
Methodologically speaking, the employment of these structuralistic terms is useful 
when it is important to differentiate the descriptive perspectives, while indicating a 
theoretical awareness of the various kinds of contextual implications (directions, levels, 
etc.) one is analytically investigating. 
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preserve the older problem due to the very fact that it embodies the 
problem's solution, its essential function is to manifest a discontinuity, the 
end of a problem. As an older problem existed in relation to a conceptual 
framework constituting a model of understanding that is replaced by the new 
concept, it is clear that the new concept typically gains its own 
meaningfulness in a structural context — or by at least implicitly referring to 
such a structural context — that is different from the older one. 
If I understand Prof Schmithausen, a leading authority in Yogãcãra 
studies, correctly, it is precisely this awareness which led him to formulate 
the methodological paragraphs 1.7(1) and 1.7(2) in his monograph on the 
concept of ãlayavijnãna (1987). According to these paragraphs, the validity of a 
postulated introductory passage of the concept of ãlayavijnãna should be 
accounted for by means of two criteria, the first criterion being essentially 
one in diachronic perspective, the second one in synchronic perspective.1 The 
second criterion demanded the functional structure, endowing the new 
concept with meaningfulness, to render the choice of the concept's name fully 
plausible, while the first criterion required that the introductory passage can 
be demonstrated to constitute a response to a systematical, doctrinal or 
exegetical constellation that had made the introduction of the concept 
inevitable. 
Although arriving at different results, it has to be emphasized that my 
investigations proceed in basic agreement with Schmithausen's methodo-
logical criteria, which have, in fact, been explicitly adopted as the valid 
standards for evaluating crucial textual passages in this monograph. 
As the Trimsikãvijnaptibhãsya and other texts representing the same stage 
of philosophical reflection evidence, Yogãcära-Vijnanavãda produced a 
whole new set of theoretical notions, which, however, do not always occur all 
together in one text. This generates the question whether the Yogãcära-
Vijnanavãda key terms have arisen together at all. And what kind of 
problems did they address? Can we perhaps even perceive the problems, to 
which these novel concepts provided solutions, as aspects of a more basic 
aporia? In what sense can we define the inception of Yogãcãra-Vijnanavada? 
Does this expression designate an integral structure of thought as a novel 
stage of philosophical reflection, and can we precisely locate its inception, or 
does it rather refer to historically disparate elements that are sometimes 
found eclectically treated together in a few texts? 
These are some of the fundamental questions that will be considered in 
this study. My aim has hereby been to critically investigate, and to positively 
demonstrate, the possibility of providing a more solid foundation for the 
historical horizon of a specifically defined Yogãcãra-Vijnanavada stage of 
philosophical reflection than has hitherto been available. 
1
 And, as it will become evident subsequently, the proper conception of the introductory 
passage of a subliminal consciousness turns out to be of significant relevance for 
understanding the inception of Yogãcära-Vijnanavãda. 
Acknowledgments 
My sincere thanks are offered to the University of Copenhagen for having 
supported my studies by a stipend, and to the colleagues, students and 
friends at its former Institute of Oriental Studies for providing an inspiring 
research milieu. Having, in the course of time, experienced this institute 
(under various names) as undergoing a sort of constant metamorphosis, it 
was invaluable, especially when the troublesome times of indological and 
buddhological studies in Copenhagen were at its lowest ebb, to have the 
friendly support of Tarab Tulku (Lha rams pa'i bge bšes bKra sis rab brtan, 
1934-2004). Born, as the nephew of Regent Taktra, into the Tibetan intellectual 
elite and living in the aftermath of the wreckage of an old cultural tradition, 
Tarab Tulku, with his calm depth and psychological complexity, has without 
doubt impressed me in our numerous philosophical discussions, not least 
during my decisive early Copenhagen years, then often conducted in the 
informal atmosphere of the Royal Library's old canteen. Rather significant 
aspects of a previous acquaintance with the Indian culture, still in Berlin, I 
owe to Prof. Chandrabhãl Tripãthi (1930-1996), my first indological teacher 
and a friend, whose tender smile has remained with me. More directly 
related to the specific investigations undertaken in this monograph, Prof. 
Lambert Schmithausen, in terms of both his scholarship and his charismatic 
personality, had a particularly strong and interestingly complex impact upon 
me. Naturally, I am grateful for the kindness he expressed in various 
efficaciously practical ways; yet also, e.g., by way of articulating (by postcard) 
his appreciation of the manner I resisted drowning and preserved, unlike 
others, the scientific necessity of a critical distance to his views. Thanks to the 
valuable comments offered by Professors Eli Franco, Claus Oetke and Tom 
Tillemans on an earlier version of the present investigations, a number of 
blunders could be rectified. And I do not wish to forget, at this place, also to 
mention the helpful contributions kindly provided by Professors Ashok 
Aklujkar, Arlo Griffiths, Harunaga Isaacson and Dr Somadeva Vasudeva in 
the course of an Indology-list discussion on the syntactic phenomenon of 
double bind constructions. Heartfelt thanks go likewise to Prof. Ernst 
Steinkellner for his being crucially involved in getting this work published. 
Much cheerful appreciation for his unfailing support is furthermore tendered 
to Ram Crowell, abroad in India, yet constantly present with indological and 
non-indological discussions, exchanges and expressions of friendship. 
